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“COMPLY OR EXPLAIN”—A FLEXIBLE MECHANISM
TO COUNTERVAIL BEHAVIORAL BIASES
IN M&A TRANSACTIONS
GERRIT M. BECKHAUS*

ABSTRACT:
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are a common phenomenon of great importance in
today’s business world. However, the majority of them fail to achieve the aspired
objectives. These failures can be attributed to various circumstances, inter alia
decision-makers’ vulnerability to behavioral biases due to the complexity,
uncertainty, and time pressure characteristic of M&A transactions. Such biases
often lead to predictable irrational behavior resulting in momentous misjudgments.
Despite numerous psychological studies proving that people systematically tend to
make irrational decisions under uncertainty, neither the transactional practice nor its
current legal framework address this problem. Instead, the present law shields
decision-makers from potential liability through the business judgment rule leaving
shareholders largely unprotected in order to preserve the freedom of good faith
business decisions.
While upholding this freedom the article suggests the implementation of a best
practice framework containing feasible strategies—several of which are developed in
the article—against irrational behavior. This framework shall be enforced through a
“comply or explain” mechanism imposing liabilities for nonobservance. “Comply
or explain,” meaning that companies may choose whether to comply with the
framework’s recommendations but have to publicly explain their reasons for noncompliance, is a regulatory approach adopted by several European corporate
governance codes. Contrary to common legislative “one size fits all” mechanisms, it
ensures maximum flexibility and minimizes interference with the business
judgment itself.

*
Associate in the Hamburg office of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP; LL.M., Yale Law School,
Ph.D. (Dr. iur.), EMBA, University of Muenster, Germany. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Gesa
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INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A)1 are a common phenomenon of
great importance in today’s business world. M&A are typically motivated
by synergetic, strategic, and efficiency-oriented considerations, aiming at
increasing competitiveness, growth, and profitability.2 Other reasons
include assumed inefficiencies within the target company causing it to be
undervalued.3 Particularly large corporate mergers will quite often
determine the involved companies’ success in the near future, if not, their
entire existence. Failure can have devastating consequences for the
companies’ employees, shareholders, and business partners. Hence, M&A
involve significant risks. Despite what is at stake and in contrast to what
one would expect based on the large number of M&A transactions, the
aspired objectives are not achieved in many cases. Respective studies have
concluded that only 30% to 50% of all M&A transactions prove to be a
success in retrospect,4 though these studies are not based on a uniform

1

While the term mergers and acquisitions is predominantly understood broadly to capture all forms of
buying, selling, dividing and combining different companies or similar entities, the following will focus on the
acquisition of a company or its shares mainly from the buyer’s perspective.
2
STEVEN M. BRAGG, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS—A CONDENSED PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 1-4
(2009); RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 873 passim (9th ed. 2009); PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 14-15, 125-79 (5th ed. 2011); STEPHAN A. JANSEN, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS –
UNTERNEHMENSAKQUISITIONEN UND -KOOPERATIONEN – EINE STRATEGISCHE, ORGANISATORISCHE UND
KAPITALMARKTTHEORETISCHE EINFUEHRUNG 135-36 (5th ed. 2008) (Ger.); STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH
W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY F. JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE 802 (7th ed. 2005); Randall Schuler & Susan
Jackson, HR Issues and Activities in Mergers and Acquisitions, 19 EUR. MGMT. J. 239, 240 (2001).
3
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 875-76; TIMOTHY J. GALPIN & MARK HERNDON, THE
COMPLETE GUIDE TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS – PROCESS TOOLS TO SUPPORT M&A INTEGRATION AT
EVERY LEVEL 5 (2d ed. 2007); Gaughan, supra note 2, at 15, 174-75.
4
See Vicki Bogan & David Just, What Drives Merger Decision Making Behavior? Don’t Seek, Don’t Find,
and Don’t Change Your Mind, 72 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 930, 930-32 (2009); ROBERT F. BRUNER,
APPLIED MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 30 (2004); ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS
THAT RISE ABOVE THE ASHES passim (2009); Don de Camara & Punit Renjen, The Secrets of Successful Mergers:
Dispatches from the Front Lines, 25 J. BUS. STRATEGY 10, 10 (2004); J. ROBERT CARLETON & CLAUDE S.
LINEBERRY, ACHIEVING POST-MERGER SUCCESS: A STAKEHOLDER’S GUIDE TO CULTURAL DUE DILIGENCE,
ASSESSMENT, AND INTEGRATION 13 (2004); JANSEN, supra note 2, at 336; Sara B. Moeller, Frederike P.
Schlingemann & René M. Stulz, Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the
Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757 passim (2005); Jeffery S. Perry & Thomas J. Herd, Mergers and Acquisitions:
Reducing M&A Risk Through Improved Due Diligence, 32 STRATEGY & LEADERSHIP 12, 13 (2004); DAVID M.
SCHWEIGER, M&A INTEGRATION – A FRAMEWORK FOR EXECUTIVES AND MANAGERS 4 (2002); see also Marc
J. Epstein, The Determinants and Evaluation of Merger Success, 48 BUS. HORIZONS 37, 37-41 (2005).
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standard5 with regard to what constitutes success.
The significant number of failed M&A transactions can be attributed
to various circumstances. Distinguishing between “hard” and “soft”
factors, the former include easily measurable elements or quantifiable
variables such as lack of potential synergies, high transaction costs or legal
obstacles.6 The latter, the so-called “soft factors,” are comprised
essentially of psychological aspects—those factors which are difficult to
ascertain but are no less significant.7 Also among them are insufficient
personal, cultural and organizational integration, and deficient planning
processes.8
Technical mistakes by the participants and decision-makers’
misjudgments are the main causes for the aforementioned aspects. While it
is comparably easy to countervail technical incapacities, for instance in the
planning process, contractual design, or in the evaluation of legal issues by
implementing control mechanisms, avoiding misjudgments is significantly
more difficult. Evaluating the prospects of success of an M&A transaction
constitutes a highly complex process, influenced by a variety of data and
interdependent circumstances and considerable reliance on predictions.9
Moreover, the information regarding the target company is commonly
incomplete. Against this background, it seems virtually impossible to
qualify an assessment of potential synergies or certain integration efforts as
right or wrong.
Obtaining further data about the target company or regulating risks
through specific contractual design are common recommendations to
decrease the danger of misjudgments with far-reaching consequences.10
However, insights from psychology regarding human behavior in
perceiving information and decision-making are widely disregarded,
though these considerations have found their way into the economic and
legal discourse through behavioral economics and behavioral law. A vast

5
Olimpia Meglio & Annette Risberg, The (Mis)measurement of M&A Performance – A Systematic
Narrative Literature Review, 27 SCANDINAVIAN J. MGMT. 418 passim (2011).
6
Robert G. Eccles, Kersten L. Lanes & Thomas C. Wilson, Are You Paying Too Much for That
Acquisition? – The Key is Knowing What your Top Price Is – and Having the Discipline to Stick to It, HARV. BUS. REV.
136, 138 et. seqq. (July-Aug. 1999); ROSS ET AL., supra note 2, at 807-08; Schuler & Jackson, supra note 2, at 241.
7
See generally Camara & Renjen, supra note 4, at 11.
8
Ronald N. Ashkenas, Lawrence J. DeMonaco & Suzanne C. Francis, Making the Deal Real: How GE
Capital Integrates Acquisitions, 76 HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 1998, at 165, 172-175; Marc J. Epstein, The Drivers of
Success in Post-Merger Integration, 33 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 174, 175-79 (2004); GALPIN & HERNDON,
supra note 3, at 3-4; Schuler & Jackson, supra note 2, at 241.
9
ROSS ET AL., supra note 2, at 796.
10
See generally JANSEN, supra note 2, at 276; Perry & Herd, supra note 4, at 12-18.
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number of studies have proven that people systematically tend to act
irrationally in decision-making processes under uncertainty with regard to
perceiving and processing information as well as the decision-making
itself.
In this article, I argue that decision-makers’—directors’ and
officers’—predictable irrational behavior in different phases of a
transaction are a significant factor contributing to momentous
misjudgments in M&A transactions and thus to their low success rates.
Nonetheless, transactional practices, as well as the current legal
framework, fail to address this problem. The present law rather shields
decision-makers from a potential liability through the business judgment
rule leaving shareholders, who are—besides employees—typically harmed
the most by failed M&A transactions, largely unprotected. The underlying
rationale for this approach is the protection of the freedom of good faith
business decisions that should not be scrutinized by courts. While
essentially upholding this freedom and avoiding a rebiasing instead of a
debiasing, this article suggests the implementation of a best practice
framework that contains certain general strategies against irrational
behavior and is to be enforced through a “comply or explain” mechanism
imposing liabilities for nonobservance. The specific area of M&A is
chosen for several reasons. First, the danger of irrational decision-making
is particularly high due to the vast amount of information, the significant
uncertainties and the time pressure. Second, the clear and widely similar
structure of transaction processes facilitates the development of common
strategies to approach the problem. Third, M&A transactions typically
have a considerable and immediate impact on the involved companies and
are particularly difficult and costly to unwind in case of failure.
Part I of the article provides an overview of insights from behavioral
economics relevant to M&A. Part II identifies potential dangers of
irrational decision-making in the different phases of an ideal M&A
transaction. Part III deals with the current legal framework sanctioning
misjudgments—in particular the decision-makers’ potential liability. Part
IV develops strategies against irrational decision-making in M&A, which
form the basis for their suggested regulatory implementation in Part V.
This regulatory model draws on experiences with U.K. and German
corporate governance law.
I. INSIGHTS

FROM

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

Besides providing some background on fundamental psychological
findings regarding the handling of information and human needs relevant
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to decision-making processes, this section enumerates behavioral biases
potentially influencing decision-making processes in M&A transactions
and discusses the transferability of scientific findings on the specific
situation of M&A with its highly sophisticated actors compared to the
general public.
To begin with, empirical studies stipulate that people of average talent
can only process seven pieces of information at a time—illustrating
people’s limited cognitive capabilities.11 To nevertheless overcome
complex moments of decision-making people—consciously or
subconsciously—rely on heuristics, or rules of thumb, to simplify the
circumstances taken into account.12
The need for avoiding cognitive dissonance, an aspect explored indepth by psychology, also matters in this context.13 People are
discomforted by conflicting cognitions. Thus, they try to completely
avoid them, amongst others by manipulation, or to eliminate them as fast
as possible. These consequences are subject to the theory of cognitive
dissonance.
The need for control is another fundamental need regulating human
behavior. The theoretical conception presumes that every person wants to
perceive himself as the initiator of changes in his environment to gain the
feeling of competence and to preserve his self-esteem.14 The satisfaction
of the need for control does not depend on the objective facts but rather
on the individual’s subjective perception.15
Finally, psychology points to the fact that people in principal evaluate
circumstances on decision-making processes relative to a point of
reference.16
The following provides an overview on behavioral biases potentially

11

George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on our Capacity for
Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81 passim (1956).
12
Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Making, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 451,
454-455.
13
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE passim (1957).
14
RICHARD DE CHARMS, PERSONAL CAUSATION – THE INTERNAL AFFECTIVE DETERMINANTS OF
BEHAVIOR passim (1968); Robert W. White, Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence, 66 PSYCHOLOG.
REV. 297 passim (1959).
15
Lauren A. Leotti, Sheena S. Iyengar, Kevin N. Ochsner, Born to Choose: The Origins and Value of the
Need for Control, 14(10) TRENDS COGN. SCI. 457, 457-58 (2010).
16
This observation constitutes an integral part of the prospect theory developed by Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979); see generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 passim (1992).
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influencing decision-making in M&A transactions. Phenomena relevant
for irrational behavior regarding the perception of information are
primarily confirmation bias,17 availability bias,18 focus on the present or
myopia,19 framing,20 contrast effect,21 herding,22 and hindsight bias.23
With regard to processing of information the following heuristics or biases

17
Bogan & Just, supra note 4, at 932; Jack W. Brehm, Postdecision Changes in the Desirability of
Alternatives, 52 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 passim (1956); David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset
Pricing, 56 J. FIN. 1533, 1550 (2001); Dan Lovallo et al., Deals Without Delusions, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2007, at
92, 94; Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202 passim (1978).
18
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 passim (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics an Biases – Biases in Judgments Reveal Some Heuristics of Thinking under Uncertainty, 185 SCI. 1124, 11271128 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahnerman, Judgment under Uncertainty]; see also Kent Daniel, David
Hirshleifer, Siew Hong Teoh, Investor Psychology in Capital Markets: Evidence and Policy Implications, 49 J.
MONETARY ECON. 139, 169-170 (2002); Terrence Odean, Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit – When All Traders
Are Above Average, 53 J. FIN. 1887, 1889 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral
Economics, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1295, 1301, 1305 (2003).
19
See George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an
Interpretation, 107 Q.J. ECON. 573 passim (1992); Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value
Immediate and Delayed Monetary Rewards, 306 SCI. 503 passim (2004); Samuel M. McClure et al., Time Discounting
for Primary Rewards, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 5796 passim (2007); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or
Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 passim (1999); see also George Ainslie, Specious reward: A Behavioral Theory of
Impulsiveness and Impulse Control, 82 PSYCHOL BULL. 463, 464 et seqq. (1975); George A. Akerlof, The Short-Run
Demand for Money: A New Look at an Old Problem, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 35 passim (1982); B. Douglas Bernheim &
Antonio Rangel, Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1558 passim (2004).
20
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343-44
(1984); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453
passim (1981); Amos Tversky & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies – Preference Reversals, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 210 passim
(1990).
21
Peter H. Farquhar & Anthony R. Pratkanis, Decision Structuring with Phantom Alternatives, 39 MGMT.
SCI. 1214 passim (1993).
22
Sushil Bikchandani, Davird Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity,
Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 152-153 (1998); Laurens Rook, An Economic
Psychological Approach to Herd Behavior, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 75 passim (2006); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C.
Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 469, 476 (1990); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE 148 (2000).
23
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ? Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment under Uncertainty,
104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 passim (1975); Baruch Fischhoff,
An Early History of Hindsight Research, 25 SOC. COGNITION 10 passim (2007); Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, “I
Knew it Would Happen” – Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORGAN. BEH. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 1 passim (1975).
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should be considered: simplification,24 mental accounting,25 anchoring,26
inside view,27 and representativeness.28 Decision-making itself is
particularly vulnerable to the effects of overconfidence29 and sunk cost.30
Apparently, the described insights from psychology and behavioral
economics do not apply to everyone in every situation in a way that
behavior could reliably be predicted. The occurrence of biases and
heuristics as well as their extent and impact rather depend on the
individual person and the specific situation. However, the vast amount of
studies in that area at least proves an existing tendency that people are
subconsciously influenced in their decision-making processes.
Due to the sophistication of the decision-makers in M&A transaction
as well as the involvement of numerous specialized consultants, one can
expect these actors to be less susceptible to the described psychological
phenomena and therefore to act more cognitively adept and rational than

24

Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 16, at 271.
Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. AND ORG. 39
passim (1980); Richard H. Thaler, Mental accounting and consumer choice, 4 MKTG. SCI. 199 passim (1985); Richard
H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183 passim (1999).
26
Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty, supra note 18, at 1128; see also Nicholas Epley &
Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI.
311 passim (2006); Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusion of Success – How Optimism Undermines Executives’
Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 2003, at 56, 60.
27
Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk
Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 24 (1993); Lisa M. Sedor, An Explanation for Unintentional Optimism in Analysts’
Earnings Forecasts, 77 ACC. REV. 731, 739 (2002); see also Arnold C. Cooper, Carolyn Y. Woo & William C.
Dunkelberg, Entrepreneurs’ Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. BUS. VENTURING 97 passim (1988); Kathryn Kadous,
Susan D. Krische & Lisa M. Sedor, Using Counter-Explanation to Limit Analysts’ Forecast Optimism, 81 ACCT REV.
377, 378 (2006).
28
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430 passim (1972); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 18, at 1124 passim.
29
See Mark D. Alicke, Global Self-Evaluation as Determined by the Desirability and Controllability of Trait
Adjectives, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1621 passim (1985); Mark D. Alicke et al., Personal Contact,
Individuation, and the Better-than-Average Effect, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 804 passim (1995); Colin F.
Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306
(1999); Kent Daniel & Sheridan Titman, Market Efficiency in an Irrational World, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 28, 28-29
(1999); Odean, supra note 18 at 1892-93; Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow
Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143 passim (1981); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 passim (1980).
30
Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGAN. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 124 passim (1985); George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the
Valuation of Objects, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157 passim (1994); Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive
Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 47 (1980); Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big
Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORGAN. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PERFORMANCE 27 passim (1976).
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the general population.31 Nonetheless, it seems highly unlikely that they
are immune to irrational decision-making. In particular with regard to
overconfidence as well as some other phenomena, there even are strong
indications for managers being affected in their decisions and decisionmaking processes.32 In light of that, albeit hard scientific proof so far does
not exist, the present state of knowledge constitutes “at least a prima facie
case” that these findings provide potentially further references on how to
improve decision-making processes in M&A transactions.33 Hence,
despite remaining doubts and a considerable amount of speculation, the
occurrence of behavioral biases influencing the decision-making processes
in M&A transactions is too conclusive and the potential gains given the
importance of M&A transaction for the involved companies too
significant to ignore the existing research.
II. DANGERS

OF

IRRATIONAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
IDEAL M&A TRANSACTION

IN

AN

This section illustrates how the insights of behavioral economics relate
to M&A transactions by describing the structure of an ideal transaction in
the form of an acquisition of a company or its shares and examining
specific situations that pose the risk of irrational behavior.
In general, M&A transactions involve a multitude of typically highly
complex decisions, which are made under great uncertainty and time
pressure.34 The complexity is above all caused by the amplitude of relevant
information and the confusing amount of interconnected processes. In
addition, there are interdisciplinary tasks and the natural divergence of
interest among the involved actors. The significant uncertainty is based on
the information asymmetry among the involved parties as well as the need
of forecasting future developments. The time pressure results from the
costs of the transaction process, potential competitors for the target
company, the respective market situation, a fixed time frame or the need
for secrecy. Given that complexity, uncertainty, and time pressure increase
the probability of irrational behavior in decision-making processes,35
particular attention is paid to these aspects.
31
See Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L.
65, 71 (2011).
32
See, e.g., Ulrike Malmedier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the
Market’s Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20 passim (2008).
33
Langevoort, supra note 31, at 74.
34
See ROSS ET AL., supra 2, at 796.
35
See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty, supra note 18, at 1124.
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With regard to M&A transactions in general, there is one structural
problem worth mentioning in this context. Executive compensation and
perquisites are typically more closely linked to a company’s growth than to
its efficiency, not least due to the focus on short term instead of long-term
success.36 Thus, managers are incentivized to favor acquisitions—
independent of their value-adding potential—over efficiency and
profitability, creating a considerable agency cost problem and amplifying
the risk and frequency of irrational decision-making.37
An ideal M&A transaction can be subdivided into three phases, which
do not run chronologically but rather integrative and iterative.38 These are
the planning, transaction, and integration phases. The following describes
the different phases’ elements and identifies at what point, respectively,
the above-mentioned phenomena of behavioral economics are of
particular importance due to the increased risk of irrational behavior in
perceiving and processing information—as well as the decision-making
process itself.
A. Planning Phase
The planning phase sets the groundwork for the future M&A
transaction and is of crucial importance for its success. Decision-makers’
misjudgments in this phase can often have a fatal impact on the transaction
process as a whole and are difficult to adjust in later stages.
1. Main Elements of the Planning Phase
The planning phase initially contains an analysis of the individual
company, in particular with regard to the company’s objectives, internal
potentials capable of being influenced, and the pursued strategy.39
Relevant diagnostic instruments one can resort to are value chain analysis,
strength and weaknesses analysis, factors for success analysis, diversification
36

Langevoort, supra note 31, at 70; Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral
Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 684-686 (2005).
37
Langevoort, supra note 31, at 70. With respect to overconfidence, see Paredes, supra note 36.
38
JANSEN, supra note 2, at 249; Reinhard Meckl, Organising and Leading M&A Projects, 22 INT’L J.
PROJECT MGMT. 455, 456-57 (2004). For further models see: DONALD DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS,
ACQUISITIONS, AND OTHER RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITIES: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO PROCESS,
TOOLS, CASES, AND SOLUTIONS 135-232 (6th ed. 2012); FLORIAN FRENSCH, THE SOCIAL SIDE OF MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS – COOPERATION RELATIONSHIPS AFTER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 64-65 (2007);
GALPIN & HERNDON, supra note 3, at 9-19.
39
DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 139-40 (6th ed. 2012); JANSEN, supra note 2, at 250.
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tests, portfolio tests, or core competence analysis.40 In addition to this
examination of internal aspects, an analysis of the business environment is
required. For instance, one might distinguish between analysis and forecast
in the areas of politics, society, economy, technology, industry analysis,
and the company’s position in the industry.41
Based on these findings one attempts to determine gaps between
actual and potential performance that is deemed realistic, particularly with
regard to the environment analysis (so called Gap Analysis).42 Having
detected gaps, one now has to consider various ways to close them. In case
decision-makers identify an M&A transaction as the most promising
measure, one should determine motive, objective, form and time frame of
the intended transaction as well as criteria for a potential target
company.43 Finally, developing a detailed strategy for the transaction is
necessary.44
2. Dangers of Irrational Behavior in the Planning Phase
During the planning phase of an M&A transaction the decisionmakers are confronted with various situations in which there are risks that
some of the above-mentioned behavioral biases45 occur subconsciously
and result in irrational behavior.
The initial self-analysis of a company is carried out on the basis of a
vast amount of information that is virtually impossible to overlook.
Despite the much more comprehensive—though still incomplete—
availability of records compared to the information on a potential target
company it is typically difficult to reach unambiguous results. In addition
to the complexity of the diagnostic tools and the interrelation of various
data, this can be explained with the dependence on external aspects that
are difficult to precisely detect as well as numerous forecasts. Moreover,
the significant costs of a thorough analysis lead to time pressure.
The inspection of the data from one’s own company bears the risk of
confirmation bias. It is hardly avoidable to approach the inspection
without certain expectations. As a consequence, decision-makers could
40
David Hussey, Company Analysis: Determining Strategic Capability, 11 STRAT. CHANGE 43, 43, 50
(2002); JANSEN, supra note 2, at 250.
41
DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 137-41; JANSEN, supra note 2, at 253-254.
42
See JANSEN, supra note 2, at 253-54; JOHN E. TRIANTIS, CREATING SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION AND
JOINT VENTURE PROJECTS 95 (1999).
43
DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 153-54; JANSEN, supra note 2, at 256.
44
DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 158-60; JANSEN, supra note 2, at 264.
45
See supra Part I.
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disregard information not conforming to their expectations. For instance,
they might miss data indicating a negative development of a currently
successful branch. In addition, ambivalent information is often interpreted
correspondingly to one’s expectations. This problem is significantly likely
to occur in cases where the decision-makers initiate the analysis with the
aspiration of a transaction.
In order to process the vast amount of data, the involved individuals
might also resort to simplification, specifically by suppressing information
qualified as insignificant. Besides difficulties in determining which
information is insignificant in the individual case, information, once
excluded from further analysis, will probably not be returned to when it
appears to be relevant later in the process. Rounding might also result in
distortion, especially if it concerns multiple variables.
Forecasts regarding strategic objectives tend to be particularly
vulnerable to irrational behavior. Overconfidence poses the greatest
danger in this context. Given the tendency to overestimate the individual
capabilities and the level of control, decision-makers might misjudge
future developments, attach too much weight to their own interpretations
and stipulate unrealistic goals (planning fallacy). Another bias that has to
be considered is the inside view which could lead decision-makers to
ignore statistical data and basic probabilities. Representativeness poses a
similar risk.
With regard to in what way gaps identified in the Gap Analysis shall
be approached, herding has to be taken into account. If there is a general
trend among M&A transactions, such as toward acquisitions, in a
respective industry or by competitors, decision-makers could be strongly
influenced by this fact. Therefore, they might fail to seriously consider
other alternatives or specifics of their own situation. Decisions could also
be affected by confirmation bias, for instance if decision-makers
themselves or their competitors recently had positive experience with an
acquisition. In that case they might overestimate the probability of success.
B. Transaction Phase
The transaction phase describes the actual deal-making—starting with
the first contact with the target until the formation of the purchase
agreement.46 While a company mainly focuses on itself in the planning

46

JANSEN, supra note 2, at 265; see also David R. Willensky, Making it Happen: How to Execute an
Acquisition, 28 BUS. HORIZONS 38, 42-43 (1985).
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phase, the transaction phase concentrates on one or more other
companies.
1. Main Elements of the Transaction Phase
Pursuing the strategy developed in the planning phase, the transaction
phase begins with contacting companies that match the respective criteria
of a pre-selection prior to entering into negotiations.47 Typically, the
parties conclude a confidentiality agreement right at the beginning in
order to protect sensitive data and to keep the transaction a secret.48 In the
course of the negotiations the target company provides potential buyers
with some basic information on the company in a teaser or—if more
detailed—an information memorandum.49 Usually, potential buyers then
render a term sheet or a more detailed letter of intent (LoI) setting out the
results of the previous negotiations and indicating their willingness to
come to an agreement on this basis.50
The LoI is followed by the due diligence, a thorough analysis and
investigation of the target company that is meant to provide decisionmakers with information and assess risk and opportunities on the
economic and legal level in preparation for a M&A transaction.51 The due
diligence has various functions. Besides risk assessment and valuation, it
typically prepares for the composition of the contractual representations
and warranties.52 Moreover, the due diligence serves the purpose of later
evidence on the information asymmetry at the time of the formation of
the contract as well as the decision-makers’ exculpation.53 One can
distinguish between commercial, financial, tax, legal, human resources,

47

JANSEN, supra note 2, at 265; see also DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 174-75.
DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 176; DONALD DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BASICS:
NEGOTIATION AND DEAL STRUCTURING 13-14 (2011) [hereinafter DEPAMPHILIS, NEGOTIATION AND DEAL
STRUCTURING].
49
See Jana P. Fidrmuc et al., One Size Does Not Fit All: Selling Firms to Private Equity Versus, 18 J. CORP.
FIN. 828, 833 (2012).
50
DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 173-75; DEPAMPHILIS, NEGOTIATION AND DEAL STRUCTURING
supra note 48, at 14-15 (2011); JANSEN, supra note 2, at 273-274.
51
DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 180-183.
52
Heinrich Pack, Due Diligence, in Handbook of International Mergers and Acquisitions 153, 156
(Gerhard Picot ed., 2002); LINDA S. SPEDDING, DUE DILIGENCE HANDBOOK: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
RISK MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS PLANNING 11 (2009).
53
BORIS BECKMANN, DUE DILIGENCE DURING COMPANY MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 10 (2006);
JANSEN, supra note 2, at 276.
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and environmental due diligence.54 For this often essential phase to
overcome information asymmetries, the target company typically provides
a data room with a selection of information about the company for a
limited period of time.55 Due to the pre-selection of the data and the tight
schedule, the due diligence by no means leads to the decision-makers
being exhaustively informed about the target.
Another component of the transaction phase is the valuation of the
company, which has crucial impact on the determination of the purchase
price.56 There are various concepts to assess the value of a company.57
However, the most common ones are discounted cash flow (DCF) or
relative value models.58 DCF models rely on estimating and discounting
all future cash flows to determine the net present value.59 The relative
value models rest on the fair market value and rely on the assumption that
a company value cannot be assessed by solely considering the company
itself but requires the inclusion of external factors, relations and market
data as well as a comparison to the other companies, such as known
purchase prices.60 The significance of the valuation concepts largely
depends on quality and extent of the available data. Evidently, the greatest
weakness of all described valuation models lies in the necessity of
predictions of future developments.61
The final important aspects of the transaction phase are the actual
negotiations as well as signing of the purchase agreement and the closing
of the transaction. For the purposes of this article the negotiations are of
particular interest. Especially in cases of more than one potential buyer or
a tendering procedure, oftentimes a difficult to control dynamic develops
due to the competitive situation and the time pressure.62

54

See, e.g., GALPIN & HERNDON, supra note 3, at 14; GARY M. LAWRENCE, DUE DILIGENCE IN
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS §§ 3-4 to 3-14 (2004).
55
DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 181-182 n.9.
56
JANSEN, supra note 2, at 278.
57
See generally DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 38, at 235-405; JOHN B. VINTURELLA & SUZANNE M.
ERICKSON, RAISING ENTREPRENEURIAL CAPITAL 153-188 (2004).
58
SCHWEIGER, supra note 4, at 20.
59
GAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 542-543.
60
HANDBOOK OF MARKETING AND FINANCE 68-70 (Shankar Ganesan ed., 2012).
61
Id. at 68-69; IAN RATNER ET AL., BUSINESS VALUATION AND BANKRUPTCY 41 (2009).
62
Deepak Malhotra et al., When Winning is Everything, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2008, at 78 passim; see
generally Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA
1089 passim (1982) (describing a new model of competitive bidding with greater risk aversion and more complete
information).
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2. Dangers of Irrational Behavior in the Transaction Phase
Similar to the planning phase there are manifold situations posing risks
of irrational behavior in the transaction phase. Compared to the planning
phase, the decision-makers uncertainty is even intensified, as less data are
available for the target company. Simultaneously, complexity and time
pressure increase. Potential competitors, the negotiation situation, or the
public learning about the transaction may lead to further difficulties.
In general, one has to consider that decision-makers, particularly in
the case of acquisitions, tend to be too positive in their outlooks, which
can influence future decision-making processes. Besides the publicly
available information especially the teaser or the information
memorandum provide the agents of the target company with an
opportunity to influence the potential buyers. In particular, framing and
contrast effect should be considered.
For clarity reasons the following is limited to identifying the risks of
behavioral biases in the core elements of the transaction phase: due
diligence, business valuation and purchase price determination, as well as
negotiations.
a) Due Diligence
In the course of the due diligence, the involved actors usually grasp as
much new information as possible, which will most likely influence the
rational perception of information. Due to prior information and
respective instructions, the actors will have a rough image of the target
company. In consequence they might tend towards confirmation bias63
and disregard data that does not confirm the expectations—or even refrain
from searching for such data.64 For instance, with regard to confusing
information or information difficult to understand availability bias could
occur subconsciously. Selection and presentation of the available data—for
example, either by framing or contrast effect—might also contribute to
irrational behavior. Contrast effect could also have an effect on the
evaluation of recent deviations from long-term continuous developments.
b) Business Valuation and Purchase Price Determination
With regard to the business valuation of the target and, closely related,
63

Lovallo et al., supra note 17, at 94-95.
See also Bogan & Just, supra note 4, at 932-934 (focusing on the costs of confirmation bias on merger
integration).
64
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the purchase price determination, overconfidence poses the central
problem. Predicting the target’s future profits or efficiency and cost gains
due to intended synergies might well be too positively forecasted.65
Frequently, decision-makers overestimate their influence on increasing the
target’s profitability and their capabilities compared to the present
management. This might result in overrating the target’s value and
determining too high of a price. Inside view could contribute to this
effect, for instance, by disregarding statistical data of comparable
transactions and therefore overestimating probabilities. The same applies
for representativeness.
Besides overly optimistic forecasts—as in the analysis of one’s own
company66—simplification might lead to distortions in processing
information. Mental accounting could result in decision-makers failing to
incorporate into their evaluation relationships among different product
divisions. The valuation concepts are not able to display this aspect.
In the context of the purchase price determination anchoring and
sunk-cost should be paid attention to. The purchase price preliminary
stipulated in the Letter of Intent or the Memorandum of Understanding
on the basis of the teaser and the publicly available information might
function as the “anchor.” Being drawn to this anchor could lead decisionmakers to inadequately adjust the price with regard to new information
discovered in the due diligence process.67 The sunk cost effect, in the
form of considering the already made investments, is likely to occur
because of the significant efforts and resources attributed to planning a
transaction and conducting the due diligence.
c) Negotiations
Irrational behaviors that have already occurred in the transaction
continue to affect the process during the negotiations. In addition, further
biases are likely to specifically influence behavior in this phase.
In particular, mental accounting might lead decision-makers to
overlook connections between the amount of the purchase price and
possible provisions on representations and warranties, arrangements with
important employees and suppliers, the transfer of loss-making branches,
or pricing in risks that contribute to a debit of the “money account.” In
65
See also Lovallo et al., supra note 17, at 95-96; see generally Roberto A. Weber & Colin F. Camerer,
Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach, 49 MGMT. SCI. 400 (2003).
66
See supra Part II.A.2.
67
Lovallo et al., supra note 17, at 99.
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case several accounts are kept relative to a point of reference, the
decreasing sensitivity for values may result in overpayments. For instance
an additional sum of $5 million seems to hardly matter in an overall
purchase price of $300 million.
Furthermore, the sunk cost effect is of particular relevance. At a
certain point decision-makers tend to close a deal at all costs given the
significant investments already made for the transaction.68 This problem is
even more aggravated in case the public knows about the efforts to acquire
the target company as—at least allegedly—the participants’ reputation is at
stake. If the transaction is structured as a tendering procedure this might
lead to proper bidding wars raising the purchase price far beyond the
initial valuation.69 Tendering procedures are likely to maximize revenues
also due to this aspect.70 In this context one might allude to the winner’s
curse, describing the fact that the successful actor in a negotiation with an
asymmetric allocation of information and uncertainty about the actual
value of the object of purchase oftentimes overpays.71 The seller typically
possesses the most meaningful information and therefore is in the best
position to assess the real value. Hence, he will rarely sell under value,
unless he is forced to sell for some reason.
C. Integration Phase
The integration phase describes the planning and implementation of
the actual merging of the target company with the acquiring company.72
A successful integration is of crucial importance for the overall success of
an M&A transaction.73 In light of this, it is astonishing that comparably
little attention is attached to this aspect.
1. Main Elements of the Integration Phase
The integration phase begins in an early stage of the transaction
process as it requires intense planning that has to be incorporated in the
68

Id.
Malhotra et al., supra note 62; Patrick J. Meister & Kyle J. Anderson, Lessons from a Failed Airline
Auction, 44 ECON. INQUIRY 311 passim (2006).
70
Milgrom & Weber, supra note 62 passim.
71
Audra L. Boone & Harold J. Mulherin, Do Auctions Induce a Winner’s Curse? New Evidence from
Corporate Takeover Market, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 1 passim (2008); Barry Lind & Charles R. Plott, The Winner’s Curse:
Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 335 passim (1991).
72
See, e.g., Meckl, supra note 38.
73
Epstein, supra note 8; GALPIN & HERNDON, supra note 3, at 3-4; Lovallo et al., supra note 17, at 96;
Weber & Camerer, supra note 65 passim.
69
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considerations regarding the business strategy.74 Moreover, there are
strong tendencies towards a cultural due diligence to better organize the
integration process and predict potential risks.75 Predominantly, in
corporate acquisitions, integration measures are commonly distinguished
between organizational, strategic, administrative, operative, cultural, and
external levels.76 Finally, instruments to measure the success of an M&A
transaction are attributed to the integration phase.77
2. Dangers of Irrational Behavior in the Integration Phase
The danger of irrational behavior already exists within the scope of
the integration planning. Due to overconfidence decision-makers often
underestimate the potential for conflict among the different corporate
cultures and the loss of efficiency caused by the integration of the targets’
employees.78 In consequence, decision-makers develop unrealistic
objectives (planning fallacy).79 Inside view might also contribute to this
problem, such as if experience and statistical data of similar procedures are
not attached with the necessary weight.
Moreover, irrational behavior might occur in the context of necessary
adjustments to the original planning after the execution of the transaction.
In case the integration does not work as expected, prompt measures are
required to countervail these undesirable developments. Following the
need for avoiding cognitive dissonance, decision-makers could tend to
conformation bias, such as disregarding early indicators of undesirable
developments and instead focusing on information affirming prior
decisions or interpret ambiguous facts respectively. The need for action
will then be discovered too late and this might then lead to a momentous
delay. This effect is amplified by self-attribution bias as adjusting the
original integration planning which constitutes the uncomfortable
admission of a previous misjudgment, which can hardly be reconciled
with a self-conception characterized by overconfidence.

74
Epstein, supra note 8, at 175-176; JANSEN, supra note 2, at 318-20; JENS KIRCHNER, PASCAL R.
KREMP, MICHAEL MAGOTSCH, KEY ASPECTS OF GERMAN EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR LAW 251-252 (2010).
75
See, e.g., Spedding, supra note 52, at 286-288. But see JANSEN, supra note 2, at 323-24.
76
JANSEN, supra note 2, at 318.
77
Epstein, supra at 8, at 178-179; JANSEN, supra note 2, at 330.
78
Lovallo et al., supra note 17, at 95.
79
Id. at 96.
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FAILED M&A TRANSACTIONS

The legal framework basically fails to address the described dangers of
irrational80 decision-making. Courts usually assume that directors and
officers of a company act rationally.81 Executives and board members can
rarely be held liable for their misjudgments irrespective of how severe the
consequences of a failed M&A deal are for the company. According to
section 4.01 of the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance, the
relevant fiduciary duty of care requires directors and officers to perform
their functions in good faith, in a manner they reasonably believe to be in
the best interest of the corporation, and with the care “that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position
and under similar circumstances.”82 More specifically, the duty of care
obliges directors and officers, amongst others, to “inform themselves,
prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably
available to them.”83 Despite this demanding standard of conduct,84
directors and officers in practice are only held liable for gross negligence
due to the not very stringent standard of review applied by the courts
under the business judgment rule in contrast to the strict duty of loyalty.85
The doctrinal classification of the business judgment rule is still

80
Irrational decision-making by some authors is understood as indication for liability with regard to the
business judgment rule in contrast to mere unreasonable decisions. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporate Law, 56 BUS. LAW.
1287, 1296 (2001); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in
Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 443 (1993). However, the term irrational decisions caused by the
described biases in the context of this article does not follow this understanding, particularly given that most biases
subconsciously influence decision-making. Rather, it is even questionable whether irrational decisions of this type
will be classified as unreasonable under the present definition of the fiduciary duty of care.
81
James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making,
62 OHIO ST. L. J. 1333, 1381-86 (2001).
82
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 138-39 (1994); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Graham v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
83
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
84
Distinguishing between a standard of conduct and a standard of review assumes that the business
judgment rule constitutes a standard of liability.
85
Allen et al., supra note 80; Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 440-41; Paredes, supra note 36, at 747.
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disputed.86 While some perceive it as a standard of liability,87 shielding
directors from liability as long as they act in good faith,88 others view it as
raising the liability bar from negligence to gross negligence.89 Again others
suggest qualifying the rule as an abstention doctrine that establishes a
presumption against judicial review of duty of care claims unless the
plaintiff can challenge that the defendant acted in good faith.90 For the
purposes of this article, however, there is no need to determine which
classification is favorable given the general consensus regarding the
required elements of the business judgment rule.
The business judgment rule stipulates four requirements. A business
judgment in good faith, first, has to be made by a director or officer who
is, second, not interested in the subject of the decision, third, “informed
with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent” he
“reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances,” and,
fourth, “rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best
interest of the corporation.”91 In case these conditions are fulfilled, the
business judgment rule shields directors and officers from personal liability
for negligent conduct that would otherwise have constituted a violation of
the fiduciary duty of care.92 Thereby, judicial review is focused on the
procedural aspects of corporate decision-making rather than its
substance.93

86

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83,
89 (2004); see also R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUS. LAW.
1337, 1342 (1993); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67
S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 287-88 (1994); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA.
L. REV. 259, 270-71 (1967).
87
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare,
Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003); see also Wayne O. Hanewicz, When Silence Is Golden: Why the Business
Judgment Rule Should Apply to No-Shops in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 28 J. CORP. L. 205, 217 (2003).
88
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due
Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 449 passim (2002); Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 444-45.
89
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 284-86 (2000).
90
See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Bainbridge, supra
note 86 passim; Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 632 (2000).
91
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 82, at 139; see also Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643
A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994); Omnibank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76, 85 (Miss. 1992); Cuker
v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1045-46 (Pa. 1997).
92
See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d
807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 88.
93
A classic example for the procedural focus can be seen in the Van Gorkom case. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer
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The underlying considerations behind the business judgment rule are,
amongst others, that judges tend to be rather ill-equipped for reliably
second-guessing the quality of business decisions—not least due to the
fact that judges are typically quite risk-averse—and, moreover, their
decisions will likely be influenced by hindsight bias knowing the negative
outcome of the challenged corporate behavior.94 In addition, a substantive
judicial review of business decisions would require significant resources,
which the courts are not willing to provide.95 The business judgment rule
basically tries to strike the balance between the competing values of
authority—including the incentives for assuming that role—and
accountability.96 It expresses an economic policy embracing economic
freedom and encouraging informed risk-taking and apparently presumes
that the benefits from entrepreneurial risk-taking exceed the costs
resulting from wrong business decisions.97
The third element, the requirement to be reasonably informed, is of
particular interest with regard to good faith misjudgments in M&A
transactions based on the described dangers of irrational decision-making.
Focusing on information that humans subconsciously tend to disregard
could probably prevent most of the mentioned biases’ influence on
decision-making.98 Hence, given that the existence of these biases is
widely accepted and, because of the emerging field of behavioral
economics, commonly known to business practitioners, one might argue
that failing to gather and consider the relevant information to actively
counteract the biases does not suffice as informing oneself “reasonably.”
While the courts might very well redefine what constitutes being
“reasonably informed”99—and have even recognized the relevance of

Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1133-1134 (2006); Lynn A.
Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment
Rule, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 675 passim (2002).
94
Allen et al., supra note 80; Langevoort, supra note 31, at 76; Paredes, supra note 36, at 735; Stout, supra
note 93, at 676; see also Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997).
95
WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 248 (2003); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 208
(2002); Bruner, supra note 93, at 1134; Langevoort, supra note 31, at 76.
96
Bainbridge, supra note 86, at 84.
97
See Allen et al., supra note 88, at 451; Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule – The Business
Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U.L. REV. 631, 632 (2002); Bruner, supra note 93, at 1134.
98
See supra Part IV.
99
For example, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman Veasey, suggested
that directors should be expected to “completely understand . . . every aspect of a company’s business and legal
issues.” See Paredes, supra note 36, at 751 (citing Alison Carpenter, Records Inspections: Delaware’s Veasey Highlights
Merits of Books and Records Inspections, 2 Corp. Accountability Rep. (BNA), May 21, 2004, at 535).
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psychological factors in individual cases100—the prevailing legal norms
clearly apply a less restrictive understanding.101 The described situation
would only fail to satisfy the business judgment rule if actual indications of
managerial misconduct had been ignored.102
There is an important and potentially outcome-determinative
difference worth mentioning between the business judgment rule in its
version in section 4.01(c) of the ALI’s Principles of Corporate
Governance, which has been adopted by the highest courts of several
states, and the way it is applied in Delaware and other jurisdictions
following Delaware law: while the former lays the burden of establishing
the rule’s elements on the challenged directors, the latter, by presuming
the rule’s fulfillment, requires the opposite.103 Plaintiffs have to
demonstrate that it has not been satisfied.104
Concluding, despite the significant and potentially preventable risks of
irrational decision-making that lead to misjudgments and bad business
decisions contributing to the failure of M&A transactions, directors and
officers practically cannot be held liable under the current law. In
combination with rewarding executives for non-value-enhancing
growth,105 this setting provides little incentive to develop strategies
challenging the described dangers.
IV. STRATEGIES AGAINST IRRATIONAL DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES
Having identified the dangers of irrational behavior in perceiving and
processing information as well as in decision-making and having dealt
with the lack of potential liability for such behavior, this section will
develop strategies against such irrational decision-making processes.
General considerations on how the described behavioral anomalies should
be counteracted are followed by suggestions of mechanisms against
specific phenomena.

100

In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938-39 (Del. Ch. 2003).
See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).
102
See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); In re Caremark Int’l, 698
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
103
See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d.
345, 361; Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 19-20 (Del. Ch. 2002).
104
Branson, supra note 97, at 635-36, 645-647.
105
See supra Part II.
101
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A. General Considerations
When thinking of strategies against irrational decision-making
processes, it is crucial to bear in mind that the described phenomena by
no means shall be demonized per se given humans’ cognitive limitations
and natural psychological needs. Most phenomena are rather essential for
an efficient decision-making process.106 Biases concerning the perception
of information, for instance, enable people to actually grasp complex
circumstances in a reasonable time frame. Studies have shown that in
individual cases limited information can lead to equal or even better
decisions compared to including extensive data.107 With regard to
processing information, simplification and anchoring are suitable
mechanisms for speedy decision-making. Finally, the tendency to
overconfidence also entails positive aspects. Overconfidence contributes to
motivation, persistence, and readiness to assume risk.108 Particularly for
CEOs, overconfidence—of course within certain boundaries—seems not
only desirable but also a defining feature of a successful performance in
this position.109 Overconfidence specifically boosts self-esteem as well as
the overall psychological well-being and has ego-protecting and anxietyeasing implications.110 This presumably prevents CEOs from being too
tentative and deliberate and at the same time enhances visionary, clear-cut
and risk-seeking decision-making.111 Projecting confidence also tends to
be beneficial for the external appearance, such as towards competitors or

106
See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The
“New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 753
(2000).
107
GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD, ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE
US SMART passim (1999); Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel Goldstein, Reasoning for the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of
Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 650 passim (1996).
108
Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 26, at 63; Malmendier & Tate, supra note 32, at 21; Eric van den
Stehen, Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision, 21 J.L. ECON. ORG. 256 passim (2005).
109
See David Hirshleifer et al., Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2012); see
also David A. Hofman, Self-Handicapping and Managers’ Duty of Care, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 803, 810 (2007);
Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance, 63 J. FIN. 2737
passim (2008); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 969-71 (2002); Paredes, supra note 36, at
684-685, 719-720.
110
See generally Andrew D. Brown, Narcissism, Identity, and Legitimacy, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 643
(1997); Lisa Farwell & Ruth Wohlwend-Lloyd, Narcissistic Processes: Optimistic Expectations, Favorable SelfEvaluations, and Self-Enhancing Attributions, 66 J. PERSONALITY 65 passim (1998).
111
Paredes, supra note 36, at 699-700.
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investors.112 Therefore, in developing strategies against the described
behavioral biases it is important to find a balance that implements
boundaries to prevent potentially harmful excesses in irrational decisionmaking but at the same time—at least with regard to most phenomena—
does not result in a complete debiasing or, even worse, a rebiasing.
Misjudgments and bad business decisions are considerably more likely
if the identified psychological phenomena occur subconsciously. An
essential step towards avoiding disadvantageous consequences from
irrational behavior therefore means to alert directors and officers at what
point in decision-making processes they are vulnerable to these
phenomena.113 For instance, when there is a specific danger of
disregarding potentially important information, attaching too much value
to certain circumstances, wrongly interpreting ambiguous data, failing to
diligently analyze individual characteristics in contrast to other market
participants, or vastly overestimating potential synergies. However,
insights from empirical studies indicate that recognizing behavioral
anomalies does not automatically lead to their avoidance.114 Humans
appear to be considerably resistant against behavior changes in this respect.
The obvious way to make someone aware of the dangers associated
with the irrational handling of information is to specifically deal in detail
with the above mentioned phenomena115 and their occurrence in the
M&A transaction process. Potential measures could be creating handouts
and brochures or providing workshops held, for instance, by psychologists,
in which decision-makers are introduced to the subject matter. Due to the
different roles of the various decision-makers in M&A transactions,
especially with regard to directors and executives, it seems desirable to
address them according to their specific function. For instance, directors
should specifically learn about which biases potentially influence
managers’ decisions in what way as well as their own biases.116 In

112

Brown, supra note 110, at 643; Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, supra note 110; Paredes, supra note 36, at

701.
113

See Joan MacLeod Heminway, A More Critical Use of Fairness Opinions as a Practical Approach to the
Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L. 81, 81-82 (2011); Langevoort, supra note 31,
at 78-79; Paredes, supra note 36, at 739-740; see also further Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 26, at 61; J. Edward
Russo & Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Managing Overconfidence, 33 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 7, 8-11, 13-15 (1992); Barry
M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Knowing When to Pull the Plug, 65 HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 68, 71.
114
See HERSH SHEFRIN, BEHAVIORAL CORPORATE FINANCE 15-16 (2007); see also Edward Teach,
Watch How You Think – Insights from Behavioral Finance Could Change the Way Companies Approach Mergers and
Acquisitions, 20 CFO MAG. 55, 57 (2004).
115
See supra Part II.
116
With regard to this differentiation, see Paredes, supra note 36, at 740.

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIB\21-1\MIB101.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 25

21-MAR-13

BEHAVIORAL BIASES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS

12:05

207

particular, this should suffice to contain the implications of framing, the
contrast effect, or the decreasing sensitivity for values due to the increasing
amount in question that comes from mental accounting.
A considerable number of decision-makers will likely deem that they
are not affected by behavioral biases given their level of sophistication. To
countervail this possible reaction, it should be emphasized that the
findings of cognitive psychology in principle apply to all humans, albeit
more or less distinctive, and that biases have been proven to specifically
occur among managers.117 One might also conduct small experiments
with the workshop participants to illustrate individual irrational
behavior.118
Another measure could be developing and introducing standardized
checklists for specific situations, which would allow a review of one’s own
behavior with regard to possible influences of subconscious factors.
Standardized checklists have been proven beneficial to more efficiently
organizing the due diligence and thus are familiar as a supporting tool in
the M&A context. A checklist for investment decisions in capital markets
developed by Fromlet119 could function as a reference point. Relying on
insights from behavioral finance, Fromlet, amongst others, recommends
questioning new information with regard to whether they are reported in
a positive, neutral, or negative way and how they align with one’s own
position.120 In addition, he suggests to specifically consider arguments
from the opposing side.121 Moreover, one should put the information in a
broader context122 and take into account the quality of the information
source. When using checklists it is crucial to ensure that they do not
constitute a mere formality or “check-the box” approach123 but actually
contribute to a more transparent, manifold, and informed decisionmaking process.
Furthermore, one should consider introducing a person responsible
for raising awareness of the dangers stemming from behavioral biases. A
proposal of Troy Paredes points in that direction: To challenge specifically
CEO’s overconfidence in M&A transactions, he has suggested appointing

117

See supra Part I.
See Teach, supra note 114.
119
Hubert Fromlet, Behavioral Finance – Theory and Practical Application, 38 BUS. ECON. 63, 68 (2001).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
See ANDREAS LASCHKE & MARTIN WEBER, DER ÖVERCONFIDENCE BIAS ÜND SEINE
KONSEQUENZEN IN FINANZMAERKTEN 9 (1999).
123
With regard to the “naysayer,” see Paredes, supra note 36, at 745.
118
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a devil’s advocate or “chief naysayer” to institutionalize dissent within the
company aiming for a more deliberative process of corporate decisionmaking.124 That person’s task would basically be to ensure that the
opposite to the intended strategy is contemplated, e.g. by asking probing
questions, challenging key assumptions, focusing on counterfactuals or
presenting other opinions.125 According to Paredes, respected, termlimited, independent directors or shareholder nominees could fill out that
role, and if needed, be supported by an independent staff of professional
advisors.126 The proposal relies on practical experience with the devil’s
advocate function in other settings127 as well as studies that have proven
negative feedback,128 and considering counterarguments129 as effective
debiasing techniques, particularly with regard to overconfidence. To
account for the naysayer’s own vulnerability to biases as well as to prevent
a “check-the-box” approach, e.g. asking only standard questions, Paredes
recommends adopting procedures for monitoring and evaluating his
performance.130
While this approach can surely contribute to a more balanced and
deliberative decision-making process, in my opinion there remain
shortcomings particularly with regard to specifically addressing the
dangers of behavioral biases. Hence, I suggest to implement an external
expert specialized in the effects of behavioral biases’ and to make him part
of the M&A team. Psychologists with the necessary economic knowledge

124

Paredes, supra note 36, at 740-747.
Id. at 740-41.
126
Id. at 745-46.
127
For how it works in the European Commission with regard to antitrust decisions, or in the Pentagon,
see Paredes, supra note 36, at 744.
128
See, e.g., Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive illusions and Their Implications for the Law,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 239-242; Howard Garland et al., De-Escalation of Commitment in Oil Exploration: When
Sunk Costs and Negative Feedback Coincide, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 721 passim (1990); Jeffrey Rachlinski, The
Uncertain Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1165, 1212 (2003); Russo & Schoemaker, supra note 113, at 1012; see also William K. Balzer et al., Effects of Cognitive Feedback on Performance, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 410 passim
(1989); William Remus et al., Does Feedback Improve the Accuracy of Recurrent Judgmental Forecasts?, 66 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 22 passim (1996).
129
See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing, 110 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 486, 494 (1991); Stephen J. Hoch, Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in Predicting Personal Events, 11 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 719 passim (1985); Charles G. Lord et al.,
Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231 passim
(1984); Russo & Schoemaker, supra note 113, at 12-13; Charles R. Schwenk & Richard A. Cosier, Effects of the
Expert, Devil’s Advocate, and Dialectical Inquiry Methods on Prediction Performance, 26 ORGAN. BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 409 passim (1980).
130
Paredes, supra note 36, at 746.
125
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or economists trained about the psychological effects would be possible
options. In contrast to an internal solution, this approach could
particularly prevent personal ties or the aspiration for higher positions
within the company influence how the expert exercises his role. Such an
expert could particularly be consulted for fundamental decisions within
the transaction process, for instance configuring the transaction strategy,
selecting the target, developing the integration plan, determining the
purchase price, or preparing the due diligence and contract negotiations.
Simply initiating decision-makers to reconsider their handling of
information in specific situations with questions and comments might
suffice as a guard against irrational behavior. Detailed knowledge of all
circumstances concerning a specific decision would not be necessary for
this purpose. The expert does, however, have to be granted access to the
respective information and responsible people to more accurately exercise
his function. In order to ensure that the expert efficiently fulfills his role, a
control and review mechanism with regard to his performance shall be
installed. In addition, he should be incentivized to aim for the company’s
long-term success.131 As a side note, the expert might not only be
valuable to shield from irrational decision-making processes but could also
advise the management on how to exploit the opponent’s vulnerability to
behavioral biases.
Despite all the described approaches making directors and officers
aware of the negative effects of subconscious behavioral biases, it is
important to be attentive that the introduction of these measures does not
lead to the misperception that simply knowing about the dangers will
shield someone from irrational decision-making.132 It rather requires a
thorough, continuous exploration of this topic and a serious application of
the insights with regard to one’s individual decision-making processes to
achieve what Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein would call “comprehensive
rationality.”133
B. Strategies Against Specific Phenomena
In addition to the described general strategies against irrational
decision-making, the following will develop further measures to avoid

131
For instance, using the long-term success as the basis for a considerable bonus, instead of pleasing his
client by e.g. encouraging the execution of the M&A deal independent of its potential value for the company.
132
With regard to the naysayer and CEO overconfidence compare Paredes, supra note 36, at 745-746.
133
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683,
746 (1999).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIB\21-1\MIB101.txt

unknown

Seq: 28

21-MAR-13

12:05

210 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:183

specific phenomena of behavioral economics from detrimentally affecting
decision-making processes.
1. Strategy Against Confirmation Bias
Beyond merely envisioning the danger of conformation bias, this
phenomenon should be countervailed by actively searching for
information not conforming with or even contradicting personal
expectations. 134 Thereby, decision-makers can learn about information
that deviates from original expectations in time and consider them
accordingly in the course of the transaction. This approach is also
favorable as a retrospective method to identify and respond to undesirable
developments as soon as possible.
2. Strategy Against Herding
To avoid that the phenomenon of herding potentially affects a
decision in favor of an M&A transaction, decision-makers in the planning
phase should specifically take into account whether increasing numbers of
acquisitions of their competitors influence their own considerations and
intentions in that regard, especially in case of a market trend towards
acquisitions as a strategy for growth. They should thoroughly assess
whether an acquisition is in fact the most promising strategy for their
company. The same applies for a situation in which a potential target is
deemed particularly interesting by several competitors at the same time. In
such a case the positive evaluation could also in part rest upon
unconsciously wanting to benefit from the others’ search efforts.
3. Strategy Against Anchoring
The occurrence of anchoring can hardly be avoided for those involved
in the determination of an original value. To prevent an inadequate
adjustment of the original value after learning of new information, one
should consult external experts that have not been participating in the
previous process.135 Their function is to undertake an evaluation on the
basis of the available data by pricing in newly discovered risks—such as
those found in the due diligence—without knowing about the “anchor.”

134
135

Lovallo et al., supra note 17, at 94-95. See also SHEFRIN, supra note 114, at 54.
Lovallo et al., supra note 17, at 99.
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4. Strategy Against Inside View and Overconfidence
The danger of misjudgments due to inside view and—closely
connected—the tendency towards overconfidence shall be countervailed
by consulting statistical data of a reference class, hence by taking an
outside view.136 For this purpose, one first needs to determine a reference
class with similar transaction projects. A second step requires one to
closely examine these projects with regard to success, outcome, process,
characteristics, etc. Based on this understanding, an intuitive prediction
shall be made in a third step to where the intended project at hand would
fall among the reference class transactions. To adjust a potentially too
optimistic prediction its reliability shall be assessed in a fourth step to
arrive at a more accurate forecast. Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman
suggest expressing the correlation between forecast and actual outcome
with a coefficient between 0 and 1, 0 indicating no and 1 indicating
complete correlation. 137 Complex calculations might require an expert
statistician. In a fifth step, the prediction made in step three shall be
adjusted by using the coefficients developed in step four. For instance, in
case the expected synergy gains have been specifically quantified, the
adjustment is undertaken by adding to this amount (SG)138 the
difference139 of the average synergy gains of the reference transactions
(GR)140 and the individual estimate (IE)141 multiplied by the developed
coefficient (C). Hence, such determination of an adjusted probability of
success (PS)142 relies on the following formula: PS = SG + [C * (IEGR)]. 143
This process could be facilitated by consulting an expert who
introduces the method, monitors the process and supervises the individual
steps. In doing so he should also question the prediction of probabilities in
136

Bent Flyvbjerg et al., Delusion and Deception in Large Infrastructure Projects: Two Models for Explaining and
Preventing Executive Disaster, 51 CAL. MGMT. REV. 170, 186 (2009); Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 27, at 2526; Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 26, at 61; SHEFRIN, supra note 114, at 47; see also Fanto, supra note 81, at
1389-1401.
137
Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 26, at 61 passim.
138
Acronym derived from (S)ynergy (G)ains
139
Assuming that due to over-optimism the individual estimate is higher than the average of the
reference transactions.
140
Acronym derived from Average Synergy (G)ains (R)eference Transaction. .
141
Acronym derived from (I)ndividual (E)stimate.
142
Acronym derived from Adjusted (P)robability of (S)uccess.
143
See generally Flyvbjerg et al., supra note 136; Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 26, at 62; see also Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Intuitive Predictions: Biases and Corrective Procedures, in TIME’S STUDIES IN THE
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES VOL. 12 313 passim (Spyros G. Makridakis & Steven C. Wheelwright eds. 1979).
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the fourth step to countervail potential tendencies towards
overconfidence.144 Thereby the expert could contribute to adjust overly
positive forecasts due to control illusion by pointing at the non-existence
of possibilities to influence outcomes or at dependencies on external
circumstances. Moreover, by requesting a plausible rationale for the
assumption that specific tasks will probably take considerably less time
than in a reference transaction, he might countervail the planning fallacy.
5. Strategy Against Sunk Cost
Similar to dangers due to anchoring,145 the risk of decisions being
affected by the sunk cost effect can be countervailed by consulting an
external expert to evaluate the available data.146 In addition, if feasible,
decision-makers should not focus on one acquisition object only but keep
other options open as long as possible and reasonably affordable.147 Such a
back-up plan facilitates ending negotiations, which do not any longer live
up to the original expectations. Decision-makers should determine an
absolute price limit148 in any case to mark the moment when negotiations
should be terminated beforehand. That way they diminish the risk of
participating in so-called bidding wars, which often, especially in
auctions, drive up the price to inadequate amounts.149 Moreover, this
constitutes an effective measure to avoid the winner’s curse.150
V. REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION

OF

DEVELOPED STRATEGIES

Having described potential strategies against irrational decisionmaking processes in M&A transactions, this section will discuss possible
forms of implementation as well as potential risks and, on this basis,
suggest a specific regulatory approach relying on a “comply or explain”
model. Given that insights from behavioral economics, despite their
publicity, have still not been truly incorporated into decision-making
processes in M&A transactions, the following considerations presume that
a legislative intervention instead of a mere informative approach is needed
to change this situation. Ultimately, I deem the deterrent of liability the
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

See also SHEFRIN, supra note 114, at 47.
See supra Part IV.A.3.
Lovallo et al., supra note 17, at 99.
Id.
Compare, with regard to determining the price limit, Eccles et al., supra note 6, at 139.
Lovallo et al., supra note 17, at 99.
Id.
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most efficient mechanism to implement the strategies developed above—
of course, carefully balanced with embracing economic freedom in
making business decisions.
A. Intensity of Interference
When considering possible forms of implementing the strategies
against irrational decision-making, one first has to determine to what
extent and level of detail directors and officers shall be obliged to apply the
suggested mechanisms. The more paternalistic approach would specify in
detail—and impose liability in case of violations—which measure has to
be taken at what phase of a transaction up to the point to dictate, for
instance, what type of questions a consulted external expert151 would have
to ask and what issues he would have to raise. Instead of such an
intervention that would considerably restrict the economic freedom with
regard to internal decision-making processes, one might also think of a
mere procedural implementation stipulating, for instance, that there have
to be institutionalized meetings scheduled at specific moments during a
transaction where the board and managers are supposed to discuss new
information and their implications for the transactions. The decision of
whether to follow a rather substantive or more procedural approach
largely depends on how one wants to strike a balance between the
decision-makers’ interest in economic freedom on the one hand and the
shareholders’—as well as in part the public—interest in preventing
potentially disadvantageous irrational decision-making processes in M&A
transactions on the other.
As mentioned above,152 the overall objective of the suggested
strategies is to shield decision-makers from vulnerability to behavioral
biases in cases where these biases lead to harmful decisions. Managers and
directors, however, shall not be deterred from innovative but risky
endeavors. Although the developed mechanisms do not directly affect the
capacity to come to a specific business decision, by introducing new
aspects into the decision-making process they are likely to result in further
deliberations and reflections influencing decisions. Hence, it is a fine line
between raising enough awareness to prevent harmful decisions caused by
behavioral biases and spreading doubts in decision-makers slowing down
or even precluding courageous, promising undertakings.
It seems hardly possible to define, on a general level, which intensity
151
152

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
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of consultation on the biases’ effects is needed to provide every individual
decision-maker with the necessary awareness. It rather depends heavily on
the characteristics of the specific person as well as the concrete
circumstances in question. Therefore, stipulating detailed provisions on
when, to what extent, and how the danger of irrational decision-making
shall be addressed lacks the necessary flexibility and might do more harm
than good. For instance, adding an external expert on behavioral biases to
the team153 might serve the intended purpose well in one context but lead
to a desirable project’s failure in others. In addition, given the remaining
need for further research with regard to the behavioral biases, such a
legislative intervention would be particularly difficult to justify.
Accounting for the specific characteristics of each individual case, the
suggested implementation shall take place on a rather abstract level by
requiring procedural safeguards complemented by suggestions to
introduce certain information and evaluations into the decision-making
process. This approach in the end relies on the presumption that awareness
of the dangers of behavioral biases will lead to a more rational and
conscious handling of the potential risks resulting in better decisionmaking. Decision-makers’ economic freedom would be widely ensured
and the level of questioning the decision-makers conduct would largely
remain within the individual company’s—more precisely the
shareholders’—power, providing a reasonable degree of protection.
B. Possible Forms of Implementation
The legal implementation of such a mechanism could be designed in
several different ways. One possibility would be to redefine the elements
of the fiduciary duty of care or the business judgment rule respectively for
instance with regard to the premise requiring directors and officers to
“inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them” or being reasonably informed
according to the business judgment rule.154 An adjustment might oblige
decision-makers to gather and consider the relevant information to
actively countervail the above-described biases and establish statutory
requirements in this regard. The duty of care would impose personal
liability in case of a violation. While this approach would clearly
determine directors and officers to carefully address the dangers of
irrational decision-making, possible side effects might be less desirable. In
153
154

See supra Part IV.A.
See generally Paredes, supra note 36, at 747-757.
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order to avoid liability, those responsible could tend to exaggerate
protective measures by including too much information and too many
eventualities into the decision-making process. This might foster riskaversion to a level not favorable to the company’s advancement155 and in
addition could result in an inefficient expansion of the internal
information and reporting system or other internal control mechanisms. It
also seems difficult to define a generalized set of rules substantiating the
duty of care requirements that fits all different types of companies and
their business models. For instance, the organization of a decision-making
process will look entirely different in a small company focusing on highrisk investments compared to a large company looking to buy a reasonable
supplement for their product range. This aspect is likely to lead to
uncertainty among the relevant parties, which would probably further
enhance the disadvantageous cautionary measures.
One might also indirectly initiate decision-makers to counteract the
dangers resulting from behavioral biases by enhancing shareholder control
over M&A transactions, such as allowing shareholders to specifically vote
on acquisitions.156 However, while this is likely to result in a more
controversial questioning of the intended transaction’s prospects, this
alone is not sufficiently focused on the specific problem of behavioral
biases’ role in M&A transactions to structurally change the current
approach. In addition, shareholder involvement poses risks to the
confidentiality of important information with regard to the transaction,
such as strategy, target valuation, etc. It further leads to greater
uncertainty in the transaction process and in general causes significant
costs.157 Shareholders might also lack the necessary sophistication to
meaningfully contribute to a more effective M&A process158 and will
themselves be subject to certain biases.
Another potential form of implementation has been suggested by
James Fanto: To enhance the decision-making process in M&A
transactions with regard to behavioral biases, he proposes to introduce a
disclosure obligation, in particular illustrating the board’s assignment of
numerical weight and order of importance to each of the enumerated
reasons in favor and against the transaction.159 Evidently, this disclosure
obligation would presuppose the creation of such a document requiring

155
156
157
158
159

See supra Part IV.A.
See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 75; Paredes, supra note 36, at 757-761.
See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 75.
See id. at 75-76.
Fanto, supra note 81, at 1396-97.
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the board to conduct a thorough and deliberate examination of the
acquisition’s prospects. While the disclosure obligation conveys a more
rational and especially more transparent decision-making process, its
introduction only addresses specific aspects of the suggested strategies.
Furthermore, accompanying measures would be necessary. First,
enabling shareholders to meaningfully make use of the disclosed
information would require revealing considerably more information than
the mere weighting of arguments. Rather, details of the transaction, the
underlying strategy and the target would be needed. Evidently, this would
constitute considerable risks to the confidentiality of the information
made available. Second, to increase the suggestion’s impact on the
decision-making process, the shareholders should be allowed to vote on
the acquisition after an obligatory debate on the transaction in light of the
disclosed document. The approach also raises practical concerns given that
it is difficult to assess whether the disclosed considerations are complete.
Finally, by involving the shareholders at a point where at least the due
diligence supposedly took place, significant costs could already have been
generated.
As a final approach, introduced in a comparable discussion by James
Fanto160 and further specified by Joan Heminway161, one could require
the issuance of a so-called fairness opinion. Fairness opinions are common
instruments in M&A transactions, prepared by external financial advisers,
usually investment bankers, to evaluate whether a specific transaction can
be considered fair from a financial point of view.162 The purpose is to
establish an impartial review of decision-makers potential deviations from
acting in the company’s interest. However, fairness opinions are often
formulated in rather vague terms, possibly to prevent liability by
overemphasizing one factor and disregarding another.163 In order to make
use of fairness opinions as a response against the behavioral biases, Fanto
and—in greater detail—Heminway suggest several modifications. First,
fairness opinions could be extended so that the authors have to consider
potential negative consequences and costs resulting from the transaction
and have to address the deal’s rationality.164 Besides these content-based

160

Id. at 1397-98.
Heminway, supra note 113, at 88-97.
162
See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557 passim (2006); Heminway,
supra note 113, at 83-85; Michael B. Rizik, Jr. & Matthew M. Wirgau, Fairness Opinions: No Longer a Laughing
Matter, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 233 passim (2008).
163
Fanto, supra note 81, at 1397-98.
164
Fanto, supra note 81, at 1398; Heminway, supra note 113, at 88-89.
161
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changes, Heminway proposes increasing the authors’ accountability to
shareholders and committing them to processes rather than outcomes to
foster their independence from the company’s directors and officers.165 As
a third step, the way fairness opinions are used and assessed by the boards
shall be modified, specifically by requiring the board members to pose a
series of questions with regard to the fairness opinions in order to raise
awareness to potential flaws in the decision-making process.166 These
questions deal with the qualification of the authors of the fairness
opinions, the reliability of the underlying data, the basis for assumptions,
the treatment of inconsistent facts and the consideration of alternatives.167
This approach would most likely contribute to a more deliberate and
rational decision-making process and it addresses a number of the abovedescribed behavioral biases. It would require considerably greater
resources, however, to provide clearer and more detailed opinions as well
as additionally consider and quantify negative scenarios, not to ask
whether investment banks are at all qualified particularly for the latter
issue. Significantly more information would be needed and would have to
be made available to the external authors. In addition, the fairness
opinions are drafted at a comparably late point of the M&A transaction so
that disadvantageous consequences might already have occurred.
Moreover, fairness opinions modified accordingly fail to specifically
address behavioral biases and rather indirectly raise awareness of their
consequences but not for the origin. Finally, standardized fairness
opinions might lack the necessary degree of individualization to
investigate the specifications of the individual transaction, at least without
significantly greater efforts of the authoring investment banks.
C. “Comply or Explain”
Given that all potential forms of implementation described so far
displayed weaknesses, the following will introduce a new and additional
approach that I opine to provide a more balanced and effective solution.
At the core of the proposal lies the development of a best practice guide—
introduced by the SEC—containing specific suggestions on what
strategies could constitute a best practice regarding decision-making
processes depending on the individual case. Instead of obliging companies

165

See Heminway, supra note 113, at 89-93.
See id. at 93-97.
167
Heminway, supra note 113, at 94-97 (citing Robert M. Lloyd, Proving Lost Profits After Daubert: Five
Questions Every Court Should Ask Before Admitting Expert Testimony, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 379, 380 (2007)).
166
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to implement some or all of these suggestions, the proposal relies on a
“comply or explain” mechanism, requiring decision-makers to provide
their shareholders and, with regard to certain non-confidential aspects, the
public, with specific reasons on all those best practice measures that have
not been implemented in the M&A transaction at hand. This shall apply
to every M&A transaction that is of relevant size, determined either by the
estimated purchase price exceeding a certain percentage of the company’s
overall turnovers or a specific amount. Thereby, every transaction of
considerable importance should be captured while also considering the
individual relevance for the respective company.
“Comply or explain” is a regulatory approach first introduced in the
field of corporate governance in the United Kingdom in the 1992
Cadbury Report.168 Based upon the recommendations of the Cadbury
Report, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code169 contains principles and
provisions on what is deemed to be a minimum standard of good
governance specifically with regard to the separation of CEO and
Chairman, the composition of boards, and board review.170 Instead of
providing a binding set of rules, companies may comply with the
provisions in the Corporate Governance Code but they are not obligated
to do so. In case of non-compliance, however, a company is required to
provide an annual public explanation as to why it decided differently. The
code only applies to companies listed on the stock exchange but is
envisioned to also encourage private companies to comply. The “comply
or explain” approach is meant to let the shareholders and the market
decide what is seen as the most important aspects of good governance.171
Due to its flexibility it is also understood to be superior to any of the
common “one size fits all” mechanisms. Other European countries as well
as Australia and Canada have followed this approach.172 In particular,
Germany added a considerable new aspect. The German Corporate
Governance Codex distinguishes between recommendations and

168
Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno & Anoine Faure-Grimaud, Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the
Comply or Explain Approach Working?, 30 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 193, 194 (2010); James E. Cicon, Stephen P.
Ferris & Armin J. Kammel, European Corporate Governance: A Thematic Analysis of National Codes of Governance, 18
EUR. FIN. MGMT. 620, 623 (2010); Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply or Explain”: Market Discipline and NonCompliance With the Combined Code, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 486, 486 (2006); Paul Sanderson
et al., Flexible or Not? The Comply-or-Explain Principle in UK and German Corporate Governance 4-5 (Ctr. for Bus.
Res., Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 407, 2010), available at www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp407.pdf.
169
UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL (2010).
170
Id.
171
Arcot et al., supra note 168, at 194-195, 198, 200-01.
172
Cicon et al., supra note 168, at 623; MacNeil & Li, supra note 168, at 486.
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suggestions.173 Only the former require an explanation for noncompliance. The latter merely serve to illustrate what is seen as best
practice. The “comply or explain” concept is widely seen as a success.174
The underlying rationale of the “comply or explain” mechanism in
the context at hand would be that the shareholders themselves and the
market shall decide which safeguards against the dangers of behavioral
biases are desirable and should be implemented. Shareholders could simply
demand the respective procedures or initiate changes to the articles of the
company; the market could favor those companies with a certain standard
of safeguards in place. This would allow the implementation of strategies
specifically tailored to the individual company and even the individual
transaction, offering maximal flexibility. Moreover, even if decisionmakers are not determined to implement any of the suggested strategies,
the mere existence of the obligation to explain ensures that the described
strategies are at least considered, which alone would raise the level of
awareness towards the dangers of irrational decision-making. This
mechanism would also come at relatively low cost, as the mere
explanation requires a limited and presumably reasonable amount of time
and effort.
Personal liability of the directors and officers could basically only
occur if the obligation to explain is violated or if the specific strategies are
disregarded although they were previously incorporated in the articles of
the company or otherwise stipulated as a binding standard. In the long run
it might also be possible that a wide implementation of the suggested
strategies changes the general corporate governance culture leading to a
market standard for decision-making processes that would redefine what
constitutes being “reasonably informed.” However, liability could only be
imposed on directors and officers if clear procedural obligations are
disregarded. This would provide certainty and in particular prevent an
expansion of the internal information processing systems to an inefficient
and disadvantageous level due to the fear of personal liability. With regard
to requests for specific strategies by shareholders as well as market
developments, it would be entirely in the hands of the decision-makers
173
See, e.g., Rules 3.10, 4.2.4, 5.1.2, 5.3.4, 5.3.5 DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX
(2010); see also Christian Andres & Erik Theissen, Setting a Fox to Keep the Geese – Does the Comply-or-Explain
Principle Work?, 14 J. CORP. FIN., 289, 289-290 (2008).
174
Gerhard Cromme, Corporate Governance in Germany and the German Corporate Governance Code, 13
CORP. GOVERNANCE 362, 364-365 (2005); HENRIK-MICHAEL RINGLEB, THOMAS KREMER, MARCUS
LUTTER ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM DEUTSCHEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX 1638-45 (4th ed. 2010);
Sanderson et al., supra note 168, at 11. But see Arcot et al., supra note 168, at 196-201 (pointing at the importance
of the quality of explanations in case of non-compliance); MacNeil & Li, supra note 168, at 493-494 (same).
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whether to be exposed to liability by approving an implementation or not,
of course accepting the risk of not being reelected in the latter case.
The content and structure of the best practice guide should be
developed after consultation with all parties typically involved in M&A
transactions as well as academics to create a catalogue of feasible,
reasonably detailed strategies that will hopefully be widely accepted. The
catalogue might include most of the above-suggested measures, especially
the consultation of external experts. It appears desirable to distinguish—
similar to the German Corporate Governance Codex—between
recommendations and suggestions. Thereby, one could ensure that all
sensible strategies are included in the catalogue to best countervail
irrational decision-making while focusing the legally obligatory part on
the most important strategies to guarantee a more efficient application.
Moreover, the best practice guide should in particular include an
explanatory section in the beginning describing the specific biases and
their risks but also their significant positive effects.175 Explanations on why
certain strategies were not implemented could be manifold. One might
think of substantive objections but also just a lack of resources or time
pressure. However, it is important that the explanations provide
meaningful content relating to the specific case at hand instead of general
abstract excuses. The quality standard will mainly depend on what
shareholders and the market demand.
Concluding, this approach provides a flexible, cautious mechanism
with little external interference that embraces the decision-makers’
economic freedom but still ensures that the awareness of behavioral biases
is raised and specific strategies to counteract these dangers are available. It
bears another important advantage worth mentioning, namely that
changing and improving the decision-making processes would entirely
come from within the company.
CONCLUSION
The article has outlined a new regulatory model to improve decisionmaking processes in M&A transactions by challenging the potential risks
of subconscious behavioral biases influencing decision-makers. Presuming
that decision-makers, despite their high level of sophistication, are
nonetheless susceptible to behavioral biases, in particular given the
complexity, the uncertainty, and the time pressure characteristic of M&A
transactions, the article recommends the introduction of a best practice
175

See supra Part IV.A.
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guide developed by an expert panel containing feasible strategies—several
of which have been described above—to countervail irrational behavior.
The suggested enforcement by a “comply or explain” mechanism ensures
maximum flexibility and interferes as little as possible with the business
judgment itself. Ensuring that the way and the extent of implementation
of the respective strategies comes from within each individual company
shall prevent the imposition of an excessive and inhibiting liability risk on
decision-makers as well as a complete debiasing—or even rebiasing. In
light of the significant number of failed—especially large scale—M&A
transactions and their potentially devastating impacts as well as the strong
indications from behavioral economics, it appears to be about time that
the legislator intervenes by providing an innovative regulatory framework.

